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1. Introduction.
Arrow’s theorem [2], as formulated by [18], is the assertion that the
decisive coalitions of a reasonable1 social welfare function F form an ultraﬁlter2
U on the set I of individuals. Here the (two or more) voters in I decide about the
“social preference” (the output of the social welfare function) on three or more
alternatives. We assume that a “reasonable social welfare function” (section 2.2)
satisﬁes certain ethical and informational requirements.
If I is ﬁnite, then U is principal (∩U = {i}) and therefore F is dicta-
torial (i is the dictator, whose strict preferences are obeyed).
If I is inﬁnite, then (assuming SPI introduced below) there exist free
(nonprincipal) ultraﬁlters U on I. Inﬁnite societies I may represent future
generations, ﬁnitely many people who extend into the indeﬁnite future or (c.f.
[23]) ﬁnitely many people who face (inﬁnitely many states of) uncertainty. In
view of [18] a free ultraﬁlter U deﬁnes a nondictatorial social welfare function.
The axiom SPI, “each inﬁnite set I carries a free ultraﬁlter”, depends
on the axiom of choice3 AC (c.f. [14]). This assertion is an example of an
independence theorem4 whose proof applies Weglorz’ models.
Roughly speaking (section 2.1), a model of (a language of) set theory gives
a “meaning” to the formulas (in that language). While “conventional” models
satisfy each axiom of ZFC (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with AC) and hence
SPI, there are other models which satisfy ZF (or its variant ZFA of section
2.1) and not SPI. It is therefore of interest to study the existence of social
welfare functions from the viewpoint of set theory, applying diﬀerent models, as
is exempliﬁed by the work of H. J. Skala ([28], [29] and [30]; c.f. section 2.3).
For Weglorz’ models WΓ
B (of ZFA set theory) the validity of SPI de-
pends on parameters which can be investigated in “conventional” ZFC. The
1 In this paper “reasonable” has a technical meaning which needs not relate to “rational”.
2 [11] uses the equivalent notion of a two-valued ﬁnitely additive probability measure.
3 Each family of nonempty sets admits a choice function which picks an element of each set of the
family.
4 “Independence theorems” (section 2.3) determine the relative strength of set theoretical axioms.
(Economists are advised to consult [16].) In order to avoid confusion (and because we use a more
general framework) we shall rename welfare axioms which mention “independence” (IIA corresponds
to monotonicity of section 2.2).
1parameters are a group Γ of permutations of the individuals and a Boolean sub-
algebra B ⊆ P(I) of the powerset (algebra) of I. (Thus B with the constants
Ø and I is a Boolean algebra w.r. to the operations ∪, ∩ and complementa-
tion −.) In the present paper we apply this observation to relate social welfare
theory in Weglorz’ models to (Armstrong’s generalization [1] of) social welfare
theory within the “conventional” models of ZFC: Weglorz’ models will provide
a framework for the investigation of diﬀerent notions of anonymity and discrim-
ination.
In social welfare theory (section 2.2), B describes the “observable” coali-
tions and Γ deﬁnes “Γ-equal treatment of” and “ﬁnite Γ-discrimination among”
the individuals (Γ-anonymity resp. topological Γ-anonymity of section 3.1). The
latter condition requires that the individuals be partitioned into ﬁnitely many
(observable) classes (“equally treated components”), each consisting of individ-
uals that are treated equally in the following sense: The social preference does
not change by any permutation in Γ, as long as it permutes individuals within
each class (component), not across diﬀerent classes. (In section 4.1 we discuss
the problem, if there are interesting topologically Γ-anonymous welfare functions
with more than two components.) We regard topological Γ-anonymity as an in-
formational (but not an ethical) requirement about the simplicity of the welfare
function: It is satisﬁed both by dictatorial functions (but not by all; c.f. lemma
23) and by functions which satisfy very strong forms of anonymity (c.f. section
3.1).
Our main result (section 3.2) is a translation between (i) assertions about
(the existence of) social welfare functions within the “mathematical universe”
(by this we mean a particular model V of ZFC which we use as a carrier of
mathematics) and (ii) assertions about (the existence of) ultraﬁlters in Weglorz’
models. The latter are instances of independence theorems (section 2.3). Note
that assertion (ii) may be true or not, depending on B and Γ; c.f. problem 1 in
sectwelfareion 4.1. (AC fails in WΓ
B , but some axioms close to AC do not.)
Exemplary result. The following assertions are equivalent:
(i) There is a reasonable ﬁnitely (Γ-)discrimatory nondictatorial social welfare
function F which observes B.
(ii) In WΓ
B there is a free ultraﬁlter on a set which represents I.
We conclude that Weglorz’ models provide meaningful information about
ﬁnite discrimination because they explain why Arrow’s theorem is true relative
to certain combinations of B and Γ. A similar analysis applies to ecological
reasoning (section 3.3). So the problem is now: Is ﬁnite discrimination such a
big deal?
We answer this question in the aﬃrmative by deriving ﬁnite discrimina-
tion from a set theoretic condition of “symmetry” which in turn we view as a
minimal requirement for “empirical meaningfulness” (c.f. [8]) or “describability”.
(So an informational condition for social welfare functions is related to notions
of philosophy.) The paper thereby complements the studies (c.f. [23] and [22]) in
computability analysis of social choice, since computability requires the existence
2of an algorithm to “describe” the social welfare function.
2. Preliminaries.
2.1. Some set theory. The ﬁrst application of independence theorems
about AC has been an analysis of diﬀerent deﬁnitions of “ﬁnite”: I is ﬁnite, if
it is equipollent to (of the same cardinality as) an element of ω = {0,1,...}. I
is Dedekind ﬁnite, if each countable subset is ﬁnite. In the presence of AC this
is another deﬁnition of “ﬁnite”. A more restrictive deﬁnition is amorphous: each
subset is ﬁnite or its complement is ﬁnite. (An inﬁnite set is amorphous, iﬀ the
Frechet ﬁlter of the coﬁnite subsets is an ultraﬁlter.)
In the absence of AC the latter two assertions are no longer deﬁnitions
of “ﬁnite”. Instead they form a hierarchy of notions of diﬀerent strength: ﬁnite,
amorphous, Dedekind ﬁnite. The following observation ([26], Proposition 1.1)
about “Dedekind ﬁnite powerset” (c.f. [16]: if I is amorphous, then P(I) is
Dedekind ﬁnite) is useful and it applies in particular to R = P(ω):
Lemma 1. Without AC, if P(I) is Dedekind ﬁnite and α is an ordinal
number, then the range of each function f : I → P(α) is ﬁnite.
Also Arrow’s theorem (and its analysis by [11] and [18]) gives rise to a
notion of ﬁniteness: A set I of individuals (with at least two elements) is Arrow
ﬁnite, if and only if each reasonable social welfare function on I (the deﬁnition
in section 2.2 includes the requirement that there are three or more alternatives)
is dictatorial (equivalently: if and only if each ultraﬁlter on I is principal). An
application of the Frechet ultraﬁlter shows that an inﬁnite amorphous set is
Arrow inﬁnite.
In ZF set theory without the axiom of choice AC, the following asser-
tions BA (due to Blass) and SPI (due to Halpern) are weak forms of AC which
do not imply AC (c.f. [14]). BA is the statement that some set is Arrow inﬁnite
and SPI asserts that “Arrow ﬁnite” deﬁnes “ﬁnite”.
• BA: There exist an inﬁnite set I and a free ultraﬁlter U on I;
• SPI: On each inﬁnite set I there is a free ultraﬁlter U on I.
In this paper we consider Weglorz’ [31] models, a speciﬁc class of per-
mutation models. Below we ﬁrst discuss the notion of a permutation model in
general, followed by a discussion of Weglorz’ models. They appear naturally in
investigations of alternatives to SPI (c.f. lemma 14); [7] surveys their properties.
Permutation models are explained in [3], [5], [14] and [16]. They are
models of the modiﬁed set theory ZFA with a set A of atoms: a ∈ A is an
object without elements but diﬀerent from Ø. (The language of ZFA has in
addition to =, ∈ and Ø the constant A.) We shall identify the individuals
with the atoms of the model. Roughly speaking the sets of the model will be
“deﬁnable5 from observable coalitions”. (For example, in order to “deﬁne” a
5 In Fraenkel’s original intuition, a model of set theory is a subclass of the “mathematical universe”
which consists of (parametrically) “deﬁnable” sets in a sense that has been made precise by [3]. We
shall use Mostowski’s deﬁnition, where the model consists of “symmetric” sets only.
3proﬁle, we partition society into ﬁnitely many “observable” coalitions, all of
whose members agree w.r. to their preferences; c.f. the proof of lemma 20.)
Given are the model (“mathematical universe”) V of ZFC and I ∈ V .
We ﬁrst construct a universe V (I) and a new ∈-relation ¯ ∈ (which we henceforth
write as ∈) such that the set A of atoms is a copy of I (as in [16] we may write
A = {ai;i ∈ I}) and
(V (I), ¯ ∈) |= ZFA + AC
Here “|=” means “satisﬁes” or “is a model of”; e.g. (V,∈) |= ZF + AC. The
details of the construction of V (I) will not matter; c.f. [3], [5], [14] or [16].
Next we deﬁne a notion of “symmetry” in terms of a subgroup Γ of the
symmetric group S(I) of all permutations on I and a group topology on Γ. (A
group topology is a Hausdorﬀ topology where the group operations, (π,ψ) 7→ π·ψ
and π 7→ π−1, are continuous. In the deﬁnition of a permutation model it will
be determined by a “normal ﬁlter” of subgroups which deﬁnes a neighborhood
base of the unit element.)
Note that π ∈ Γ deﬁnes a permutation ¯ π on the set A of atoms:
¯ π(ai) = aπi for π ∈ Γ. It extends to a permutation (a proper class) ˆ π of
V (I) (Mostowski collapse) such that ˆ π(x) = {ˆ π(y);y ∈ x}. (We write π instead
of ˆ π.) Then x ∈ V (I) is symmetric, if its stabilizer stab(x) = {π ∈ Γ;π(x) = x}
(= sym(x) in [16]) is an open (and therefore also closed) subgroup of Γ. We
regard the open subgroups of Γ as “degrees of symmetry”. (This is evident for
the group of the p-adic integers [5]. In general, however, they generate a topology
which appears peculiar.)
A general permutation model M consists of the “hereditarily symmetric”
x ∈ V (I) (i.e. each element of the transitive closure of {x} is symmetric, where
the transitive closure consists of x, its elements, the elements of these elements
..., ending with an atom or Ø). Thus x ⊆ M, an object of V (I), is a set in
the sense of the model, iﬀ x ∈ M, iﬀ x is (hereditarily) symmetric.
If x ∈ V (Ø) (there is no atom in the transitive closure of x), then x is a
pure set. Pure sets are hereditarily symmetric (their stabilizer is the whole group
Γ) and therefore in the model. (The pure sets form a copy of the “mathematical
universe” within the model, whence lemma 2.)
AC fails in M, unless Γ is discrete: Set theoretical choice functions
in general are not symmetric. However, the following choice principle is always
true. (It says that, in a permutation model, a set carries a wellordering relation,
if and only if it is equipollent to a pure set.)
• PW : The powerset P(α) of an ordinal α is equipollent to an ordinal.
Lemma 2. Permutation models satisfy ZFA + PW .
Weglorz’ models WΓ
B ⊆ V (I) are constructed from an inﬁnite Boolean
algebra B ⊆ P(I), a subgroup Γ of its automorphism group Aut(B) and Weglorz’
group topology. (A bijective π : B → B is in Aut(B), if π(Ø) = Ø, π(I) = I,
π(x ∪ y) = π(x) ∪ π(y), π(x ∩ y) = π(x) ∩ π(y) and π(−x) = −π(x).)
We shall assume that B contains all singletons {i}, where i ∈ I. Then
At(B) = [I]1 (recall that [I]n is the set of n-element subsets of I), where
4At(B) is the set of the Boolean algebra atoms (minimal nonempty sets in B).
It follows that π ∈ Aut(B) may be identiﬁed with a permutation ˜ π ∈ S(I):
π ∈ Aut(B) ⇒ π({i}) = {˜ π(i)} ∈ At(B) for some ˜ π ∈ S(I) and B ∈ B ⇒
π(B) = {˜ π(i);i ∈ B}. (We thereby identify Aut(B) with the subgroup stab(B)
of S(I) which we actually use in the deﬁnition of the model.)
Weglorz’ group topology is deﬁned from a neighborhood base of the unit
element (the permutation id). We deﬁne (a ﬁlter base)
• FWeglorz = {stab(b); b ∈ B}
Then U is a neighborhood of the unit element, iﬀ it contains a ﬁnite intersection
of FWeglorz. The group topology is generated by the subbasis {π ·stab(b);π ∈ Γ
and b ∈ B}.
Using the above identiﬁcations we may deﬁne (“<” means “subgroup
of” and Sﬁnite(I) is the group of all ﬁnite permutations of I):
Definition. Given are a Boolean algebra B and a group Γ such that
[I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I) and Sﬁnite(I) < Γ < Aut(B). The permutation model WΓ
B
consists of the hereditarily symmetric objects of V (I), where symmetry is deﬁned
w.r. to the group Γ and the Weglorz’ group topology.
The assumption Sﬁnite(I) < Γ is included for technical reasons only. It
will ensure that WΓ
B |= ¬AC.
We may reformulate “symmetry”. If x ∈ WΓ
B , then (by the above
deﬁnition) there exists a ﬁnite D ⊆ B such that
stab(x) ⊇ ﬁx(D) = ∩{stab(d); d ∈ D}
We may enlarge D to a subalgebra of B. Then At(D) forms a ﬁnite ordered
partition
Π = hP1,...,Pmi
of A into elements Pk ∈ B which partition satisﬁes the following deﬁnition of a
support of x
• stab(x) ⊇ stab(Π) (= {π ∈ Γ;π(Pi) = Pi, all i} = ﬁx(D))
In this paper we wish to compare the objects of Weglorz’ models with
sets of the “mathematical universe”. The formulation of our results is simpliﬁed,
if we use the same terminology for related objects.
As we use the same notation (i) for the individual i ∈ I ∈ V and the atom
ai ∈ A ∈ WΓ
B (see above), it will be convenient to identify also (ii) the set I ∈ V
of all individuals and the set A ∈ WΓ
B of the atoms of the model, (iii) the Boolean
algebra atom {i} ∈ B ∈ V and the singleton {ai} ∈ P(A) ∈ WΓ
B , (iv) the element
b ∈ B ⊆ P(I) ∈ V and the set ¯ b = {ai;i ∈ b} ∈ P(A) ∈ WΓ
B (its stabilizer is in
FWeglorz) and (v) B ∈ V with a subalgebra ¯ B = {¯ b;b ∈ B} ⊆ P(A) ∈ WΓ
B .
As follows from lemma 6, in general we cannot relate π ∈ Γ ∈ V to
a permutation in S(A) ∈ WΓ
B . Let us recall the identiﬁcation (vi) of π ∈
Aut(B) ∈ V with a permutation ˜ π ∈ S(I) ∈ V , (vii) of π ∈ S(I) ∈ V with
¯ π ∈ S(A) ∈ V (I) and (viii) of π ∈ S(A) ∈ V (I) with ˆ π, a “permutation” of
V (I). In order to link our results with the economic literature (c.f. [21]), in V we
identify (ix) Aut(B) with the B-measurable permutations π of I (they satisfy
π∗(B) = {π−1(i);i ∈ B} ∈ B, whenever B ∈ B). (Note that π ∈ Aut(B) deﬁnes
5a B-measurable ˜ π ∈ S(I). If conversely π ∈ S(I) is B-measurable, then π is a
representation of (π∗)−1 ∈ Aut(B).)
The original motivation behind WΓ
B has been the following result of
Weglorz [31] which says that in the identiﬁcation (v) above ¯ B = P(A).
Lemma 3. If I is inﬁnite, [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I) and Sﬁnite(I) < Γ < Aut(B),
then WΓ
B |=“B = P(A)”.
Weglorz’ theorem relates Armstrong’s setting [1] to the formally simpler
approach of [18]. Lemma 3 asserts that, given B, we may consistently add the
axiom “B is isomorphic to a powerset algebra” (which in general contradicts
AC) to ZF set theory. As follows from lemmas 22 and 23, this axiom does not
completely reduce [1] to [18]: [1] admits social welfare functions which are not
topologically anonymous and therefore not in the model.
In Weglorz’ models, the set of individuals sometimes is amorphous and
always has a Dedekind ﬁnite powerset [8].
Lemma 4. If I is inﬁnite, [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I) and Sﬁnite(I) < Γ < Aut(B),
then WΓ
B |=“B is Dedekind ﬁnite”.
We illustrate the method of proof in WΓ
B by lemma 6 about an easy
correspondence between the “mathematical universe” and the model. First we
recall the following result [6] about partitions.
Lemma 5. Let I be inﬁnite and assume [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I) and Sﬁnite(I) <
Γ < Aut(B). In WΓ
B all but ﬁnitely many elements of a partition E of the set A
of the atoms into ﬁnite sets are singletons.
Lemma 6. Let I be inﬁnite and assume [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I) and Sﬁnite(I) <
Γ < Aut(B). In V (I), if π ∈ S(A) is a permutation on the set A of the atoms,
then π ∈ WΓ
B if and only if π ∈ Sﬁnite(A).
Proof. As “if” is trivial (a ﬁnite permutation is deﬁned from ﬁnitely
many parameters within the model), we prove “only if”. Deﬁne a partition E
which consists of the sets {πz(a);z ∈ Z} where a ∈ A (π0(a) = a, π1(a) = π(a)).
These sets are ﬁnite by lemmas 4 and 1. Lemma 5 implies that (with ﬁnitely
many exceptions) all E ∈ E are singletons, where π(a) = a. It follows that
{a;π(a) 6= a} is contained in the ﬁnite union of the ﬁnite nonsingletons of E.
In [8] (a variant of) Weglorz’ models with Γ = Aut(B) has been given an
empirical interpretation (invoking the “theoretical terms” of philosophy): B is
the algebra of the “observable” objects and the model consists of those empirical
concepts which satisfy a necessary (but not suﬃcient) semantical test6, namely
“symmetry” (hereditary symmetry), to be “describable”. (Thus the model is
constituted of those concepts which are not “empirically meaningless for obvious
reasons”.)
6 It is motivated by “Padoa’s method” [13] to prove undeﬁnability.
6It follows from lemma 6 that the deﬁnition of “describable” depends in
an essential way on “indescribable” (“theoretical”, “empirically meaningless”)
permutations.
2.2. Some welfare theory. We formulate the basic notions of welfare
theory in a general setting. Our framework incorporates both the theory of Arrow
type social welfare functions (sections 3.1 and 3.2) which map “ordinal preference
proﬁles” to social preferences and a theory of ecological welfare mappings7.
Recall that I is the set of individuals. A proﬁle structure is a relational
structure (tuple) X = (X,p), where X is a set of alternatives (not necessarily
ﬁxed or ﬁnite) and p is a proﬁle (deﬁned below) of I on X. We represent the
preferences of the individual i ∈ I by a binary relation ¹i on X. (We do not
always assume that it is transitive and complete8.) The strict preference ≺i and
the indiﬀerence ∼i are deﬁned in the usual manner. Finally, a proﬁle p of I
on X is a function p : I → P(X × X), a list p = h¹i;i ∈ Ii of the individual
preferences on X.
The proﬁle structure Y = (Y,q) is a substructure of X = (X,p) (symbol:
Y ⊆ X), if Y ⊆ X and for all x, y ∈ Y and for all i ∈ I the assertions
(x,y) ∈ q(i) and (x,y) ∈ p(i) are equivalent. Thus q is the restriction p|Y
which maps i ∈ I to the relation p(i)|Y = p(i) ∩ (Y × Y ).
An aggregation structure is a relational structure (X,¹,p). It adds a
social preference (“decision”) ¹ to the corresponding proﬁle structure. (Unless
stated otherwise, the social preference may be just a binary relation on X.) A
substructure of an aggregation structure carries the restricted social preference
(and the restricted proﬁle).
Social decision theory is concerned with the construction of aggregation
structures from proﬁle structures. A decision rule is a function F whose domain
dom(F) is a set of proﬁle structures of the same signature (i.e.: I is kept ﬁxed)
and whose range is a set of aggregation structures such that
F(X,p) = (X,¹F,p) for X = (X,p) ∈ dom(F)
Here ¹F depends on X, p and F .
A subset (coalition) S ⊆ I is decisive with respect to an aggregation
structure (X,¹,p), if x ≺ y whenever x, y ∈ X and (∀i ∈ S)(x ≺i y). A
coalition S ⊆ I is decisive (with respect to a decision rule F ), if for every
X ∈ dom(F), S is decisive with respect to the aggregation structure F(X).
Given a decision rule, an agent i ∈ I is a dictator, if {i} is decisive. The
decision rule satisﬁes strict unanimity (or “Pareto-eﬃciency”), if I is decisive.
A decision rule is more general than Arrow’s social welfare functions.
Arrow assumes that the set X of the alternatives is ﬁxed and that the individual
preferences are deﬁned on X. Thus in Arrow’s setting Y ⊆ X would carry the
7 They assign a preference relation to each set of utility distributions (“utility proﬁles”). We will
see that a well-behaved (“monotonic”) ecological welfare function is equivalent to a social preference
on the set of utility distributions (section 3.3; c.f. “social welfare orderings” [25] or [9]).
8 Several textbooks call this a “rational preference”.
7proﬁle on X (instead of its restriction). In our approach, when considering a
subset Y , we forget the additional information about X \ Y . If we consider
only monotonic decision rules (as did Arrow, see below), then (for ﬁnite sets of
alternatives) the diﬀerence disappears.
Our approach appears natural from a logicians point of view: A structure which is based on Y usually
carries only relations which are deﬁned on Y. We do not require the individuals to make up their
minds about potential alternatives not in Y. This has the following advantage: In Arrow’s setting
ethical principles may have unintended consequences (neutrality implies IIA) which cannot be derived
in the general framework.
Social choice theoretists, on the other hand, may feel uneasy about the arbitraryness of the
domain of a decision rule, which is an arbitrary set of proﬁle structures of the same signature. (Even
the set of potential alternatives has not to be speciﬁed.) In addition to incorporating social welfare
functions (where the domain is ﬁxed once the set of potential alternatives and the set of individuals
are ﬁxed) as special classes, our formulation has an advantage as a descriptive theory: Consider the
modeling of political decisions about ecologically tolerable lay-outs of a projected highway. Often the
alternatives are compared by procedures which are deﬁned for ﬁnite sets Y of (actually discussed)
alternatives only. During the decision process other alternatives will be added, but there is no a
priori upper bound, as the set X of potential alternatives is inﬁnite and will never be speciﬁed in
practice. (As an application, [9] relate procedures such as “Borda counts” to legal requirements
about decision-making.)
Given a set X, a set P of proﬁles (of I) on X and a decision rule F
which is deﬁned on X ⊇ X0 = {(X,p);p ∈ P}, we deﬁne the corresponding
social welfare function CF(p) in Arrow’s sense as the mapping that assigns to
each proﬁle p ∈ P the social preference of F(X,p). Conversely, an Arrow
social welfare function C extends to a decision rule FC such that FC(Y,q) =
(Y,C(q+)|Y,q), where Y ⊆ X and q 7→ q+ ∈ {p;p|Y = q} is a set theoretical
choice function. (If we consider only Y = X, then q+ = p and to each Arrow
social welfare function with domain P there corresponds a unique decision rule
F with domain X0.)
While CF is uniquely deﬁned, FC depends on the choice of q+ in
general. Thus CFC = C is true, but FCF = F needs not be true. However,
if F satisﬁes the following condition of monotonicity, then the last identity holds
for all choices of q+.
The decision rule F is monotonic, if for proﬁle structures X1 ⊆ X2
(where Xi ∈ dom(F)) we have F(X1) ⊆ F(X2) as aggregation structures.
It is weakly monotonic, if we add the requirement |X1| = 2 to the above
deﬁnition. These notions correspond to Arrow’s IIA (“independence of irrelevant
alternatives”).
We say that the domain of F is closed under two-element (ﬁnite) sub-
structures, if |X1| = 2 (X1 ﬁnite) and X1 ⊆ X2 ∈ dom(F) imply X1 ∈ dom(F).
Lemma 7. Without AC, a weakly monotonic decision rule F is mono-
tonic, if its domain is closed under two-element substructures.
Proof. A decision rule F whose domain is closed under two-element
substructures deﬁnes a monotonic canonical aggregation structure (X,¹F,can,p)
on X ∈ dom(F), namely x ¹F,can y ⇔“x ¹F y is true in F(Y)”, where
Y = {x,y} is the substructure of X. If F is weakly monotonic, ¹F=¹F,can.
We are now ready to formulate (a special form of) Arrow’s theorem. We
let X be a set with at least three alternatives and assume that the domain of F
is:
• X I = {(Y,q);Y ⊆ X and q ∈ P
I(Y )} where
8• P
I(Y ) = {q;q : i 7→ transitive and complete preference q(i) on Y }
We use X I (which is a set of structures) instead of the “conventional” set P
I(X)
of proﬁles. The same proof will work for “rich” domains in general, but it will be
easier to compare decision rules of the model WΓ
B with those of the “mathematical
universe”, if we conﬁne ourselves to dom(F) = X I .
Lemma 8. Without AC, let I have two or more elements, X three
or more elements and consider a nondictatorial monotonic decision rule F on
dom(F) = X I which satisﬁes strict unanimity such that ¹F is transitive and
complete. Then the set U of decisive coalitions is a free ultraﬁlter on I.
Proof. The proof (e.g. [10], p. 578-580) reduces to considerations about
three-element structures X ∈ dom(F) (whose proﬁle p is a function on I with
at most 23×3 values p(i)). The proﬁles of I on X are explicitly deﬁned in terms
of ﬁnitely many subsets of I. Therefore AC is not applied. Note that the proof
does not insist on the existence of a free ultraﬁlter.
In the ecological context (section 3.3) Arrow’s axioms will not suﬃce
to derive (a result whose proof resembles) Arrow’s theorem. There we need, in
addition, (an extension of) May’s [20] axiom of neutrality. Neutrality asserts
that the alternatives are “treated equally”. We prefer Mihara’s interpretation
[21] that neutrality is a condition of computational simplicity. (In the ecological
context “equal treatment” of the alternatives is built in the deﬁnition of the
structures.)
A mapping Φ : X → Y is an isomorphism of the proﬁle structures X
and Y, if Φ is a bijection from X to Y and for all i ∈ I and for all x, y ∈ X we
have (x,y) ∈ p(i) ⇔ (Φ(x),Φ(y)) ∈ q(i). An isomorphism Φ of the aggregation
structures (X,¹,p) and (Y,v,q) is an isomorphism of the proﬁle structures
(X,p) and (Y,q) such that x ¹ y ⇔ Φ(x) v Φ(y), all x, y ∈ X.
A decision rule F respects isomorphisms, if each isomorphism Φ of the
proﬁle structures X, Y ∈ dom(F) is also an isomorphism of the aggregation
structures F(X) and F(Y). In this case ¹F depends on the isomorphism type of
the proﬁle only. This condition relates in the following way to the “conventional”
axiom of neutrality. (Note that the form below does not imply monotonicity, since
the domain of F consists of proﬁle structures whose proﬁles q, q0 need not be
deﬁned on the set X of all alternatives. In section 3.3 we shall consider another
variant of this notion.)
Lemma 9. Without AC, suppose that F is a monotonic decision rule
with domain X I . Then F respects isomorphisms, if and only if for all two-
element proﬁle structures Y = ({x, y},q), Y
0 = ({x0, y0},q0) ∈ X I (and
mappings u 7→ u0) the assertion
(∀i ∈ I)((x,y) ∈ q(i) ⇔ (x0,y0) ∈ q0(i))
implies x ¹ y ⇔ x0 ¹0 y0, where ¹ (resp. ¹0) is the social preference of F(Y)
(resp. F(Y
0)).
Proof. The assertion says that Φ(u) = u0 is an (arbitrary) isomorphism
between (arbitrary two-element proﬁle structures) X and X
0. The conclusion
9says that Φ is an isomorphism of the aggregation structures. This is a special
case of respected isomorphisms. We now apply monotonicity: Φ is an isomor-
phism between proﬁle/aggregation structures, if and only if it is an isomorphism
between all two-element substructures.
As has been observed by Fishburn [11] (c.f. [18]), a free ultraﬁlter on I
(if it exists) deﬁnes a decision rule as in the following (slightly stronger) lemma.
There are other decision rules with the same ultraﬁlter of decisive coalitions, too
(c.f. [21], p. 510-511). We set
• P(x,y) = Pp(x,y) = {i ∈ dom(p);x ¹i y}
Lemma 10. Without AC, let X be a set of at least three options, let I
be an inﬁnite set of individuals and assume that there is a free ultraﬁlter U on
I. If (Y,q) ∈ X I , then the relation ¹U on Y,
x ¹U y ⇔ Pq(x,y) ∈ U
is a transitive and complete social preference on Y . The aggregation F(Y,q) =
(Y,¹U,q) deﬁnes a monotonic, strictly unanimous decision rule on X I which
respects isomorphisms and does not admit a dictator.
Proof. Note that the general form of Ã Lo´ s’ theorem (which relates to
quantiﬁers) depends on AC (c.f. [14]). Lemma 10, however, applies instances of
this theorem (for quantiﬁer-free statements) which do not depend on AC, but
refer directly to the deﬁning properties of ultraﬁlters, instead.
We simplify our notation by introducing the following terminology: A
reasonable social welfare function on I is a monotonic and strictly unanimous
decision rule on the (transitive and complete) proﬁle structures X I (where X ∈ ω
is a ﬁnite set of at least three options) whose social preferences (decisions)
are transitive and complete. (It is identiﬁable to a “reasonable” social welfare
function in Arrow’s sense. Henceforth we shall no longer refer to Arrow-type
social welfare functions.)
2.3. Some independence theorems. The Arrow and Fishburn the-
orems establish an obvious link to AC via ultraﬁlters. Independence results
about ultraﬁlters in their turn lead naturally to Weglorz’ models. These models
of ZFA prove independence theorems for ZF set theory (without atoms), since
we may apply lemma 11, the Jech-Sochor transfer theorem [16]. It compares
the “initial segments” Pα(·) of the models (deﬁned by means of the up to αth
iterates of the powerset operation P(·)).
Lemma 11. Given are a ZFC model V , a permutation model M ⊆
V (I) and a V -ordinal α. Then we may construct a ZF model W ⊇ V and a
set B ∈ W such that Pα(A) of M is ∈-isomorphic to Pα(B) of W .
Of particular interest is the structure of the prime ﬁlters (equivalent:
ultraﬁlters, maximal ﬁlters) of B within the model. We recall the following
results from [7] about Γ = Aut = Aut(B) (it satisﬁes Sﬁnite(I) < Aut(B)). Note
that (in V ) the countable structured atomic Boolean algebras are isomorphic
to each other [7], where B is structured, if each inﬁnite b ∈ B splits into two
10inﬁnite elements of B. (Lemma 12 appears to be in contrast to lemma 27 which
constructs a prime ﬁlter. However, as a set in WΓ
B the algebra B is not countable
by lemma 4. This situation resembles “Skolem’s paradox” of set theory.) Note
that the proof of lemma 13 in [7] (theorem 4 with I = ω) extends immediately
to inﬁnite I. [Let Sj ⊂ Pi have maximal cardinality.]
Lemma 12. If I = ω and B is a countable (in V ) atomic algebra such
that [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I), then the following assertions are equivalent.
(i) V |=“B is structured”
(ii) WAut
B |=“Each ultraﬁlter on A is principal”.
Lemma 13. If I is inﬁnite and B = P(I), then in WAut
B each bounded
complex-valued ﬁnitely additive measure m on P(A) is concentrated on a ﬁnite
set.
By [7], the conclusion of lemma 13 is equivalent to “in WAut
B there is
no (ﬁnitely additive) probability measure on P(A) which vanishes on the ﬁnite
sets” (c.f. lemma 4). In particular, if I is inﬁnite and B is the powerset algebra,
then
WAut
B |=“ultraﬁlters on A are principal”
In the models of lemmas 12 and 13 A is Arrow ﬁnite but inﬁnite. (By
lemmas 8 and 10 SPI implies “Arrow ﬁnite = ﬁnite”. If BA fails, then each
set I with at least two elements is Arrow ﬁnite.) We apply lemma 11 to obtain
the following independence result of Skala [28].
Lemma 14. Relative to ZF set theory, the following assertion depends
on AC: “If I has at least two elements, then I is ﬁnite, if and only if I is
Arrow ﬁnite”.
[7] mentions “counterexamples” (lemma 15), where A is Arrow inﬁnite.
Another trivial result is lemma 16.
Lemma 15. Let I be inﬁnite.
(i) If B is the algebra of ﬁnite and coﬁnite sets and Sﬁnite(I) < Γ < Aut(B),
then in WΓ
B the Frechet ﬁlter (of the coﬁnite sets) is the unique free ultraﬁlter
on A.
(ii) If Γ = Sﬁnite(I) and [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I), then in WΓ
B each nonprincipal ﬁlter
on A may be extended to a free ultraﬁlter.
Lemma 16. Let I be inﬁnite, assume [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I) and let U be a
nonprincipal prime ﬁlter of B. Then Γ = {π ∈ Aut(B);πU = U}(= stab(U))
satisﬁes Sﬁnite(I) < Γ < Aut(B) and WΓ
B |=“U is a free ultraﬁlter on A”.
We next determine the structure of these ultraﬁlters from within the
model (Lemma 18). A ﬁlter U on I is a Ramsey ﬁlter, if each ﬁnite partition
hC1,...Cni of [I]2 admits a homogeneous set H ∈ U (which satisﬁes [H]2 ⊆ Ci
for some i ≤ n). Note that a free Ramsey ﬁlter is an ultraﬁlter. [Given S ⊆ I
consider the partition C1 = [S]2, C2 = [I \ S]2 and C3 = [I]2 \ (C1 ∪ C2). If U
is free, then |H| ≥ 3 and so [H]2 ⊆ C3 is impossible. As H ∈ U is homogeneous
it follows that H ⊆ S or H ⊆ I \ S, depending on [H]2 ⊆ C1 or C2.]
11Lemma 17. Let I be inﬁnite and assume [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I) and
Sﬁnite(I) < Γ < Aut(B). In V (I), consider C ⊆ [A]2. Then C ∈ WΓ
B , if
and only if for some ordered partition (support) Π = hP1,...,Pmi of A into







([Pi ∪ Pj]2 \ ([Pi]2 ∪ [Pj]2))
where Mk ⊆ [{1,...m}]k.
Proof. We verify “only if”: Let Π be a support of C. If S ∈ C ∩[Pi]2,
then {π(S);π ∈ Sﬁnite(Pi)} = [Pi]2. Therefore C ⊆ [Pi]2, as these permutations
extend to elements of stab(Π), and we may set M1 = {{i};C ∩ [Pi]2 6= Ø}.
Similarly, if S ∈ C and S∩Pi 6= Ø, S∩Pj 6= Ø and i 6= j, then C ⊆ [Pi∪Pj]2\
([Pi]2∪[Pj]2) and we may set M2 = {{i,j};C∩([Pi∪Pj]2\([Pi]2∪[Pj]2)) 6= Ø}.
Lemma 18. Let I be inﬁnite and assume [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I) and
Sﬁnite(I) < Γ < Aut(B). Then WΓ
B |=“free ultraﬁlters on A are Ramsey”.
Proof. In WΓ
B , let U be an ultraﬁlter on A, hCk;k ≤ ni be a ﬁnite
partition of [A]2 and let Π be a support of U and all Ck. As Π is a ﬁnite
partition of A and U is an ultraﬁlter, there is some i ≤ m such that Pi ∈ U.
The set H = Pi is homogeneous. For if {i} ∈ M1(k), then [H]2 ⊆ Ck (where
M1(k) is M1 of Ck in lemma 17) and {i} 6∈ ∪k≤nM1(k) is impossible. [Otherwise
the Ck do not cover [Pi]2 ⊆ [A]2.]
This result relates to the “social structure” of decision rules. As has been
observed by Skala [30], p. 255, decision rules which correspond to free Ramsey
ﬁlters are of a particular interest: They admit a decisive coalition where “each
knows the others” (a “clan”), or a decisive coalition where “no one knows any
other”. ([30] uses the partition C1 = {{i,j};i knows j}, assuming that then
also j knows i, and C2 = [I]2 \ C1.) We have shown in lemma 18 that this
observation applies to all reasonable nondictatorial social welfare functions on A
in WΓ
B ; it also applies to dictatorial ones. This motivates another “deﬁnition of
ﬁnite”:
A reasonable social welfare function on I is Ramsey, if the ultraﬁlter of
the decisive coalitions is principal or Ramsey. A set I of individuals with at least
two elements is Skala ﬁnite, if and only if each reasonable social welfare function
with the domain X I is Ramsey (equivalently: if and only if each ultraﬁlter on I
is principal or Ramsey).
Arrow ﬁnite implies Skala ﬁnite and in all Weglorz’ models the set A of
atoms is Skala ﬁnite by lemma 18. Lemma 19 (which follows from lemmas 15 and
11) shows that these notions are of a diﬀerent strength. So we have a hierarchy:
ﬁnite, Arrow ﬁnite, Skala ﬁnite.
Lemma 19. Relative to ZF set theory, the following assertion depends
on AC: “If I has at least two elements, then I is Skala ﬁnite, if and only if I
is Arrow ﬁnite”.
12Skala (c.f. [29], p. 214) has investigated the signiﬁcance of independence
results9 for the economist. He argues that in social choice theory existence
results which depend on AC (or its weak forms SPI and BA) in an essential
way should not be taken as undebatable facts. In this paper we do not insist
on a particular axiomatic system of set theory being suitable for studying social
choice. Instead, we investigate several alternatives (in terms of B and Γ).
3. Main results.
3.1. Finite sets of alternatives. How does Armstrong’s setting [1]
relate to the models?
We ask for a condition which ensures that a decision rule F on the
alternatives and proﬁles of WΓ
B (which will be sets of WΓ
B ) is a set in the sense
of WΓ
B . To this end we will relate the set theoretic notion of “symmetry” with
the social choice theoretic notion of “anonymity” (c.f. [20]). We assume (in this
and the next section, only) that
• X is ﬁnite and ﬁxed.
In view of [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I) (which reduces the number of dictators to 0
or 1) we may identify the set I of the individuals with the set A of the atoms
of V (I) [and have V (I) |=“B ⊆ P(A)”]. Economists (c.f. [1]) interpret B as the
algebra of all “observable” (or “describable”; c.f. [23]) coalitions; by lemma 3 in
WΓ
B “symmetry = describability” (for subsets of A).
If Γ = Aut(B), then the interpretation of [8] requires that empirically
meaningful concepts (e.g. social welfare functions) should be described in terms
of “observable” coalitions only: These descriptions ensure (hereditary) symme-
try. Hence empirically meaningful social welfare functions should be symmetric
(and the asymmetric ones shall not be viewed as idealizations of real decision pro-
cedures). We extend this interpretation to the general case Γ < Aut(B), where
the “description” of the “meaningful” concepts might use additional structure.
For example, Γ = stab(U) of lemma 16 permits deﬁnitions which use the prime
ﬁlter U.
The ﬁnite set X of options will be represented by its cardinal number,
a pure set in WΓ
B . The next step is the characterization of the preferences
of the model. As the options form a pure set of WΓ
B , it follows trivially that
each collection of options and each preference relation (of the “mathematical
universe”) is pure, too, and therefore a set in the sense of the model.
The description of the proﬁles and proﬁle structures of the model is
nontrivial: We ask for a criterion that a proﬁle structure (X,p) (where dom(p) =
A represents I) on a ﬁnite pure set X is a set in the sense of the model. The
following condition (due to [1]) which is a notion of “describability” (c.f. [8] and
[23]) ensures that: p is B-measurable, if x, y ∈ X ⇒ Pp(x,y) ∈ B. We set
• P
I
B(X) = {p ∈ P
I(X);p is B-measurable}
9 [4] has proposed similar arguments about the axiom of constructibility.
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and the options form a ﬁnite set X ∈ WΓ
B , then for a proﬁle p ∈ V (I) of A on
X the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) p ∈ WΓ
B
(ii) V (I) |=“p is B-measurable”.
Proof. If p ∈ WΓ
B , then x, y ∈ X implies (for sets in WΓ
B ) that
P(x,y) = {a ∈ A;x ¹a y} ∈ P(A). By lemma 3 this powerset in the sense
of WΓ
B corresponds to (the copy of) B (in the model V (I)); therefore V (I) |=
P(x,y) ∈ B. Conversely, a proﬁle p ∈ V (I) on a ﬁnite (and without loss of
generality pure) set X attains at most ﬁnitely many values p(a) =vk∈ WΓ
B ,
k = 1,2,...K. As p is B-measurable, P(x,y) ∈ B and therefore
p−1(vk) = Sk = {a ∈ A;p(a) =vk}
= {a ∈ A;(∀x,y ∈ X)(x ¹a y ↔ x vk y)}
= ∩{P(x,y);x vk y} \ ∪{P(x,y);x 6vk y}
∈ B ⊆ WΓ
B , as X is ﬁnite.
We conclude that p is deﬁned as follows as a set in WΓ
B
p(a) =vk∈ WΓ
B , if a ∈ Sk ∈ WΓ
B , where k = 1,...K.
We next consider a decision rule F on X A and ask if its restriction to
WΓ
B is in the model. The domain “X A in the sense of WΓ
B ” (i.e. X A ∩ WΓ
B )
is the set X A
B of the “B-measurable proﬁle structures” in V (I), where (in the
“mathematical universe”) we deﬁne:
• X I




B and (the ﬁnite pure set) X is not moved by the permutations
in Γ, a decision rule F with domain X A
B satisﬁes F ⊆ WΓ
B . Thus F ∈ WΓ
B , iﬀ
F is symmetric.
In social choice theory (c.f. [21]) a permutation π ∈ S(I) deﬁnes a
permutation
p0 = pπ = h¹πi;i ∈ Ii
of the individual preferences p. In lemma 22 we apply this notion to translate
symmetry. There we let p0 correspond to the permutation π−1 (and its extension
to the sets of V (I)).
• A decision rule F on X I
B is Γ-anonymous, where Γ < S(I), if for all permuta-
tions π ∈ Γ the following holds, whenever Y ⊆ X and qπ on Y is B-measurable:
¹=¹0, where
¹ is the social preference (decision) of F(Y,q) and
¹0 the social preference (decision) of F(Y,qπ).
• A decision rule F on X I
B is M-anonymous, if it is S(I)-anonymous.
• A decision rule F on X I
B is C-anonymous, if it is Sﬁnite(I)-anonymous.
• A decision rule F on X I
B is topologically Γ-anonymous, where Γ < S(I) is a
topological group, if there is an open (relative to Γ) subgroup Γ0 < Γ such that
F is Γ0-anonymous.
The idea of Γ-anonymity may be traced back to e.g. [20]. It is a condition
14of “equal treatment” of individuals (voters), where “equality” is (informally) de-
ﬁned by means of a group Γ of permutations and statements (such as CF(p) =¹)
which should be invariant under Γ. Here the assumption Sﬁnite(I) < Γ is derived
from the minimal requirement that each pair of individuals be “treated equally”.
M-anonymity is anonymity in the sense of Mihara [21]. It corresponds
to the maximal assumption of “equality”: Equipotent coalitions are “treated
equally”.
If Γ < Aut(B), then the condition qπ ∈ P
I
B(Y ) is satisﬁed for all π ∈ Γ,
Y ⊆ X and q ∈ P
I
B(Y ), whence in this case Γ-anonymity generalizes the
“conventional” deﬁnition which omits “whenever ...” and refers to the ﬁnite
permutations only. [Apply remark (ii) in [21], p. 506: pπ is B-measurable,
as π ∈ Aut(B) is B-measurable.] The “conventional” notion therefore is C-
anonymity.
As we shall consider only Weglorz’ topology, we may reformulate topo-
logical anonymity in terms of supports. (Note that a decision rule F ∈ WΓ
B
admits a support Π: If π ∈ stab(Π), then π(F) = F .) A decision rule F on X I
B
is topologically Γ-anonymous, if for some partition Π of I into ﬁnitely many
elements of B and all permutations π ∈ stab(Π) it holds that ¹=¹0. Thus only
the voters within the same class of the partition are “equally treated”. (The
group stab(Π) does not contain all ﬁnite permutations but only those which
exchange individuals in the same class.)
If Γ0 < Γ and F is Γ-anonymous, then F is also Γ0-anonymous. We
conclude:
Lemma 21. Without AC, let I be inﬁnite, assume [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I)
and Sﬁnite(I) < Γ < Aut(B), let F be a M-anonymous decision rule on X I
B and
endow Γ with the Weglorz topology. Then F is (topologically) Γ-anonymous.
Γ-anonymity is strictly stronger than topological Γ-anonymity in gen-
eral. For a C-anonymous decision rule excludes dictators, while a topologically
Sﬁnite(I)-anonymous decision rule does not [let Γ0 < stab({i}), i the dictator].
Lemma 22. Let I be inﬁnite, assume [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I) and Sﬁnite(I) <
Γ < Aut(B), endow Γ with the Weglorz topology and consider a decision rule
F ∈ V (I) on X A
B , where X is ﬁnite. The following assertions are equivalent:
(i) F ∈ WΓ
B
(ii) V (I) |=“F is topologically Γ-anonymous”.
Proof. In view of the assumption dom(F) = X A
B , the domain is
supported by any Π. (We may use more general F , intersecting Γ0 with the
stabilizer of some support of the domain.)
We ﬁrst show that if π ∈ Γ, then π−1(q) = qπ. The computation of
this group action is as follows.
Consider the extension of π ∈ S(I) to V (I) and let q ∈ V (I) be
a function on the set A of atoms whose range consists of binary relations
q(a) =¹a⊆ Y 2 ⊆ X2 ∈ V (I). We assume without loss of generality that the ﬁ-
nite set X ∈ WΓ
B is pure. Then q ⊆ WΓ
B and the permutations of stab(Π) do not
15move Y ⊆ X. In this case π(¹a) = {hπx,πyi;x ¹a y} =¹a, whence π−1(q) =
{hπ−1a,π−1(¹a)i;a ∈ A} = {hπ−1a,¹ai;a ∈ A} = {hb,¹πbi;b ∈ A} = qπ.
We conclude that π−1(Y,q) = (π−1Y,π−1q) = (Y,qπ). If we apply
this identity to F we obtain π−1(F(Y,q)) = π−1(Y,¹,q) = (Y,¹,qπ) and
F(π−1(Y,q)) = F(Y,qπ) = (Y,¹0,qπ). Here the social preferences ¹ and ¹0
are the same as in the deﬁnition of Γ-anonymity. Hence π commutes with F
(i.e. π(F(X)) = (π(F))(π(X)) = F(π(X)) or π(F) = F as graphs), if and only
if the social preferences ¹=¹0 coincide. It follows that stab(Π)-anonymity is
the assertion that Π is a support of F .
We conclude: Decision rules which fail to be topologically anonymous are
“empirically meaningless”, even if they are constructed without AC! Lemma 23
illustrates this point.
Lemma 23. Without AC, let I be countably inﬁnite and assume [I]1 ⊂
B ⊆ P(I). There is a reasonable B-social welfare function F on I which respects
isomorphisms but which is not topologically Γ-anonymous for any Γ with the
Weglorz topology and Sﬁnite(I) < Γ < Aut(B).
Proof. We construct a hierarchical social welfare function F associated
to an injective sequence δ = hdn;n ≥ 0i of individuals dn ∈ I. (A similar
construction gives a nondictatorial F ; c.f. [21], p. 510.) We set x ¹F y, if
(lexicographically) either x ∼dn y for all n ≥ 0 or if x ≺dm y for some m ≥ 0
and x ∼dn y for all n < m. If n 6= m, then dn and dm are not “treated
equally”. We obtain a contradiction, as a topologically anonymous decision rule
distinguishes only ﬁnitely many classes of “equally treated” individuals.
The structure of the decision rules is considerably simpliﬁed, if the pro-
ﬁles are strict; here p is strict, if all ∼i= Ø. Lemma 24 excludes “hierarchies
of dictators” as in lemma 23. Lemmas 23 and 24 are illustrations of the more
general problem 5.
Lemma 24. Without AC, let I be inﬁnite, assume [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I) and
consider a set F of dictatorial decision rules F on dom(F) = {(Y,q) ∈ X I
B;q is
strict}. Then F(Y,q) = (Y,q(dF),q) for F ∈ F with the dictator dF ∈ I and
F is topologically anonymous.
3.2. Applications. The formulation of our main result may be sim-
pliﬁed, if we use the notation of [1]: A reasonable B-social welfare function is a
monotonic and strictly unanimous decision rule which is deﬁned on the transitive,
complete and B-measurable proﬁle structures X I
B (instead of X I ; again X ∈ ω
is a ﬁnite set of at least three options) whose social preferences are transitive and
complete. It then “observes” B.
Theorem 1. Let X ∈ ω be a ﬁnite set of at least three options, I an
inﬁnite set of individuals, B ⊆ P(I) the algebra of observable coalitions which
satisﬁes [I]1 ⊆ B and Γ < Aut(B) a permutation group such that Sﬁnite(I) < Γ
and Γ carries the Weglorz’ topology. Then the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) V |=“there is a topologically Γ-anonymous reasonable B-social welfare func-
tion on I which does not admit a dictator”;
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function on A which does not admit a dictator”, where B ⊆ P(A) ∈ V (I) is the
copy of B ∈ V ;
(iii) WΓ
B |=“there is a reasonable social welfare function on A which does not
admit a dictator”;
(iv) WΓ
B |=“there is a free ultraﬁlter on A”.
Proof. (i) ↔ (ii) carries the notational simpliﬁcations of section 2.1.
(ii) ↔ (iii) is the content of lemmas 20 and 22. (iii) ↔ (iv) follows from lemmas
8 and 10.
Theorem 1 has several economic applications. Combining it with lemmas
13 and 21, we may improve proposition 1 in [21]. (Note that B = P(I) implies
Aut(B) = S(I) and X I
B = X I .)
Lemma 25. In ZFC, let I be inﬁnite and suppose a reasonable so-
cial welfare function F on I is nondictatorial. Endow S(I) with the Weglorz
topology. Then F violates topological S(I)- (and therefore M-) anonymity.
If we use lemma 12 instead, then we obtain the following analogy to
theorem 1 of [21]:
Lemma 26. In ZFC, let I be countably inﬁnite, B with [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I)
be countable and structured and endow Aut(B) with the Weglorz topology. Then
a nondictatorial reasonable B-social welfare function on I violates topological
Aut(B)- and M-anonymity.
Fishburn’s resolution of Arrow’s impossibility, lemma 10, has been criti-
cized on various grounds. For example, [19] mention that decision rules which are
based on prime ﬁlters exhibit an inherent arbitrariness in selecting decisive coali-
tions. Lemmas 25 and 26 are illustrations of this point in Armstrong’s setting.
Note that for B of lemma 26 there is a “constructive” nondictatorial reasonable
B-social welfare function F (by lemmas 10 and 27).
Lemma 27.Without AC, if I is inﬁnite and B is countable and satisﬁes
[I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I), then B admits a nonprincipal prime ﬁlter U.
Proof. Modify the construction in [24] or [22]. [24] gives a social choice
interpretation of the proof. [22] considers the algebra of the recursive (decidable)
subsets of ω and constructs a nondictatorial social welfare function which is
“pairwise computable” relative to the second jump Ø00.
In general, by lemma 26, lemma 27 deﬁnes welfare functions which are
not anonymous. (As [24] notes, the construction depends in an essential way on a
ﬁxed enumeration of the observable coalitions. By lemma 4 no such enumeration
is in the model.)
As follows from lemma 15 (ii) and theorem 1, the existence of topolog-
ically Γ-anonymous B-social welfare functions depends both on Γ and B. As
the ultraﬁlter of lemma 15 has support Π = hAi, in lemma 28 we can strengthen
topological to C-anonymity (c.f. [21] on p. 506).
17Lemma 28. In ZFC, let I be inﬁnite and assume [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I).
Then there exist nondictatorial reasonable B-social welfare functions which sat-
isfy C-anonymity.
Lemma 16 shows that a nonprincipal prime ﬁlter which is declared “de-
scribable” is not lost by the model; hence by lemma 10 (as the support of the
ultraﬁlter is Π = hAi):
Lemma 29. In ZFC, let I be inﬁnite, assume [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I), let U
be a nonprincipal prime ﬁlter of B and set Γ = {π ∈ Aut(B);πU = U}. Then
there exist nondictatorial reasonable B-social welfare functions which satisfy Γ-
anonymity.
In view of Lemma 16 all prime ﬁlters of the “mathematical universe” can
be made “describable”, and so is e.g. Fishburn’s welfare function of lemma 29.
By lemma 23 there are, however, “inherently meaningless” reasonable B-social
welfare functions not in any WΓ
B (but taken care of by [1]).
Proposition 2 of [21] translates into a set theoretical result which im-
proves upon lemma 15 (i):
Lemma 30. In ZFC, let I be inﬁnite, let B be an algebra which satisﬁes
[I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I) and does not contain complementing sets of the same cardinality
and assume Sﬁnite(I) < Γ < Aut(B). Then WΓ
B |=“there are free ultraﬁlters on
A”.
Proof. Proposition 2 of [21] asserts that there is a reasonable B-
social welfare function which satisﬁes M-anonymity. It satisﬁes topological Γ-
anonymity by lemma 21. Now apply theorem 1. (In V (I) the ultraﬁlter of this
construction is U = {S ∈ B;|S| = |A|}.)
3.3. Inﬁnite sets of alternatives. In the ecological context there are
decision problems which ask for inﬁnite societies with inﬁnitely many choices (c.f.
[9]). There the individuals i ∈ I represent potential hazards such as damages
of type Di due to a substance Si in a medium Mi, Ti years from now. We
assume that there are inﬁnitely many dangers about which we communicate in
terms of a Boolean algebra B of “types” of risks. An atom of B represents a
classiﬁcation of equivalent hazards which by the assumption [I]1 ⊆ B are not
further diﬀerentiated. Also it is natural to assume that the set X of the options
is inﬁnite (c.f. section 2.2).
For many practical purposes it suﬃces to consider (substructures of)
the standard structure (R
I,ps), where for (the alternatives) x, y ∈ R
I we set
x ≤i y ⇔ x(i) ≤ y(i) and ps(i) =≤i is the standard proﬁle. The standard
structure identiﬁes the options with assignments of individual “cardinal” utilities.
It has an obvious ecological interpretation ([9]): The alternative x is identiﬁed
with the allocation x ∈ R
I of the (forecasted) quantitative measurements of its
induced i-th damage. (For example, identify Di with the expected concentration
x(i) of a substance Si. This interpretation gives a special meaning to x(i) = 0.)
The bounded standard structure is the substructure `∞(I) ⊆ R
I of
the bounded functions. (As follows from lemma 31, in Weglorz’ models the
18“bounded” notion coincides with the general one.)
We are interested in the “describable” options of R
A∩WΓ
B : The decision
maker is confronted with imagined damages x : I → R. Let us assume that the
risks are described (or approximated in the mind of the decision maker) in terms
of ﬁnitely many types of “similar” potential hazards (coalitions of B). Then the
describable options are B-simple, where a function x : I → R is B-simple, if it
takes only ﬁnitely many values r ∈ R and all x−1(r) ∈ B. (Thus we should not
think of I as a time series, as the assumption excludes e.g. exponential decay.)
We let `B(I) ⊆ R
I consist of all B-simple options. The restriction ps|`B(A) of
the standard proﬁle to `B(A) is a set in the sense of WΓ
B . We call it the B-simple
standard proﬁle and abbreviate it as ps (if there is no danger of confusion).
Lemma 31. Let I be inﬁnite and assume [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I) and
Sﬁnite(I) < Γ < Aut(B); then (for R
A ∈ V (I)) we have R
A ∩ WΓ
B = `B(A).
Proof. Since a B-simple function ∈ V (I) is deﬁned as a set in WΓ
B
(constructed in a ﬁnite way from parameters ∈ WΓ
B , such as r ∈ R, b ∈ B), it
is a set in the sense of WΓ
B . Conversely, a function x : A → R ∈ WΓ
B is ﬁnitely
valued by lemmas 4 and 1. As each x−1(r) is a subset of A in the sense of the
model, lemma 3 implies x−1(r) ∈ B.
Many of the decision rules F (or “ecological indices”) which are actually
applied in ecological risk management (e.g. political decisions) are deﬁned on
X ﬁn
B (I). (This domain of the “mathematical universe” will be identiﬁed with
X ﬁn
B (A) ∈ WΓ
B .)
• X ﬁn
B (I) = the ﬁnite substructures of (`B(I),ps)
Legally sound decisions (c.f. [9]) seem to require monotonicity. Then
Y ∈ X ﬁn
B (I) implies that F(Y) = (Y,¹F,can |Y,ps|Y ), where ¹F,can is the
canonical “decision” on R
I (deﬁned as in the proof of lemma 7). Isomorphisms
need not be respected. [Example: Indices which use weighted arithmetic means.]
We ask for a description of the monotonic decision rules on X ﬁn
B (A)
which are sets in WΓ
B . “Anonymity of section 3.1” loses its original intent. [It
is automatically satisﬁed: If π ∈ Γ, then pπ
s = ps; also π(ps) = ps.] Instead
we apply neutrality (c.f. [20]) together with anonymity (in the sense of “social
welfare orderings” in [25], but for π restricted to Γ). For these methods a version
of Arrow’s theorem will apply.
Lemma 32 is the ecological counterpart to lemma 9. Its condition of
neutrality roughly means that beyond its ordinal information the cardinal mea-
surement of the damages does not matter. (So we are in a situation which
resembles the theory of Arrow’s social welfare functions.) Note that there are
some neutral methods of ecological planning. (This is an empirical fact; c.f. [9].
We do not propose their use.)
Lemma 32. Without AC, a monotonic decision rule F with domain
X ﬁn
B (I) respects isomorphisms, if and only if it is 1-neutral: for all x, y, x0, y0 ∈
`B(I) the following assertion
19(∀i ∈ I)(x(i) ≤ y(i) ⇔ x0(i) ≤ y0(i))
implies the assertion x ¹F,can y ⇔ x0 ¹F,can y0.
The following condition of invariance (where (x ◦ π)(i) = x(π(i))) is a
variant of “anonymity in the theory of social welfare orderings”.
• A relation ¹ on `B(I) is Γ-anonymous, if
x ¹ y ⇒ x ◦ π ¹ y ◦ π
for all π ∈ Γ and all x, y ∈ `B(I) such that x ◦ π and y ◦ π ∈ `B(I).
• A relation ¹ on `B(I) is topologically Γ-anonymous, if it is Γ0-anonymous for
some open Γ0 < Γ.
• A monotonic decision rule F on X ﬁn
B (I) is (topologically) Γ-anonymous, if
¹F,can on `B(I) is (topologically) Γ-anonymous.
We may combine neutrality and anonymity into the following condition
of “Γ-neutrality”.
Lemma 33. Without AC, let Γ < Aut(B), where [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I).
Then a monotonic decision rule F with domain X ﬁn
B (I) is Γ-anonymous and
respects isomorphisms, if and only if it is Γ-neutral: for all π ∈ Γ and all
x, y, x0, y0 ∈ `B(I) the following assertion
(∀i ∈ I)(x(i) ≤ y(i) ⇔ x0(πi) ≤ y0(πi))
implies the assertion x ¹F,can y ⇔ x0 ¹F,can y0.
Proof. If Γ0 < Γ, then Γ-neutrality implies Γ0-neutrality and therefore
1-neutrality of lemma 32. Next we consider x∗ = x ◦ π−1 and y∗ = y ◦ π−1.
Then π ∈ Aut(B) implies x∗, y∗ ∈ `B(I). As x∗(πi) = x(i) and y∗(πi) = y(i),
Γ-neutrality (with x0 = x∗, y0 = y∗) implies x ¹F,can y ⇒ x∗ ¹F,can y∗ which
is Γ-anonymity.
Assume conversely that ¹F,can is Γ-anonymous and 1-neutral. Let
x, y, x0, y0 satisfy the premise of Γ-neutrality. Then for all j ∈ I (which we write
as j = π(i), some i ∈ I) we have x∗(j) ≤ y∗(j) ⇔ x(i) ≤ y(i) ⇔ x0(j) ≤ y0(j),
whence by 1-neutrality x∗ ¹F,can y∗ ⇔ x0 ¹F,can y0. Anonymity implies
x ¹F,can y ⇔ x∗ ¹F,can y∗ [x ¹F,can y ⇒ x∗ ¹F,can y∗ and x∗ ¹F,can y∗ ⇒ x =
x∗ ◦ π ¹F,can y = y∗ ◦ π]. Therefore x ¹F,can y ⇔ x0 ¹F,can y0.
The following characterization of Γ-anonymity is similar to lemma 22.
It applies isomorphisms Φ between ﬁnite substructures of `B(A). Note that each
such Φ ∈ V (I) is a set in WΓ
B (and conversely).
Lemma 34. Let I be inﬁnite, assume [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I) and Sﬁnite(I) <
Γ < Aut(B) and let Γ carry the Weglorz topology. The following assertions are
equivalent for a monotonic decision rule F ∈ V (I) with domain X ﬁn
B (A) which
respects isomorphisms.
(i) F ∈ WΓ
B
(ii) V (I) |=“F is topologically Γ-anonymous”.
Proof. “(ii)⇒(i)”. In view of lemma 33 we may assume that ¹F,can
is stab(Π)-neutral, Π a ﬁnite ordered partition of A into elements of B. Then
20¹F,can is supported by Π. For given x ¹F,can y, consider x∗ and y∗ from the
proof of lemma 33. Then x∗ = π(x) and y∗ = π(y), where π ∈ stab(Π) now acts
on the sets. [π(x) = {hπa,π(x(a))i;a ∈ A} = {hb,x(π−1b)i;b ∈ A} = x∗, where
b = π(a) and π(r) = r for r = x(a) ∈ R.] As x(i) ≤ y(i) is equivalent
to x∗(πi) ≤ y∗(πi), all i ∈ I, we conclude from stab(Π)- neutrality that
x ¹F,can y ⇔ x∗ ¹F,can y∗ ⇔ π(x) ¹F,can π(y); thus π(¹F,can) =¹F,can.
“(i)⇒(ii)”: If Π is a support of F , then ¹F,can is stab(Π)-neutral. For
assume that for all i ∈ I and some π ∈ stab(Π) and x, y, x0, y0 we have
x(i) ≤ y(i) ⇔ x0(πi) ≤ y0(πi). Then the substructures on {x,y} and on
{x0 ◦ π,y0 ◦ π} of (`B(A),ps) are isomorphic, whence x ¹F,can y, if and only if
x0◦π ¹F,can y0◦π, if and only if x0 = π(x0◦π) ¹F,can π(y0◦π) = y0 [here we use
π ∈ stab(Π)]. This is stab(Π)-neutrality and the conclusion follows from lemma
33.
The (bounded) standard structure satisﬁes Arrow’s and Fishburn’s the-
orems, lemma 35, but the substructure of the ﬁnitely supported allocations (the
“support” {i ∈ I;x(i) 6= 0} is ﬁnite) does not (c.f. [9] and the references cited
there). It is therefore meaningful to reprove theorem 1 for the standard structure.
[Note the following diﬀerence to Arrow’s theorem: The dictator depends on the
particular proﬁle ps, but the options are variable. A dictator i therefore has a
diﬀerent meaning: The ecological decision maker primarily will be interested in
minimizing the danger “i”. Also, the standard structure is not “rich”: While
(0,1) ≤1 (1,0), there is no other proﬁle p such that for the individual “1” we
have (1,0) ¹1 (0,1).]
In analogy to the terminology of sections 2.2 and 3.2 (recall footnote
1) we say, that a monotonic and strictly unanimous decision rule on X ﬁn
B (I)
which respects isomorphisms [!] and whose social preferences are transitive
and complete is a reasonable B-ecological welfare function on I. A reasonable
ecological welfare function is deﬁned on the ﬁnite substructures of the standard
structure, instead. Lemmas 3 and 31 imply that a reasonable ecological welfare
function on A which is a set in WΓ
B is a reasonable B-ecological welfare function
in V (I).
Lemma 35. Without AC, let I have two or more elements and consider
a nondictatorial reasonable ecological welfare function on I. Then the set U of
decisive coalitions is a free ultraﬁlter on I. Conversely, given a free ultraﬁlter
on I, we may construct a nondictatorial reasonable ecological welfare function
on I.
The following ecological results paraphrase the social ones. First, we
combine lemmas 34 and 35.
Theorem 2. Let I be an inﬁnite set and assume [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I) and
Sﬁnite(I) < Γ < Aut(B). Then the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) V |=“there is a topologically Γ-anonymous reasonable B-ecological welfare
function on I which does not admit a dictator”;
(ii) WΓ
B |= “there is a free ultraﬁlter on A”.
21Next we apply the lemmas 12, 13 and 15, 30 about ultraﬁlters in WΓ
B .
Lemma 36. In ZFC, assume that I = ω and let either B = P(I) or
B be countable and structured such that [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I). If Aut(B) carries the
Weglorz topology, then topologically Aut(B)-anonymous reasonable B-ecological
welfare functions are dictatorial.
Lemma 37. In ZFC, let I be inﬁnite and let B be an algebra which
satisﬁes [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I). Assume that either Γ = Sﬁnite(I) or that Sﬁnite(I) <
Γ < Aut(B) and B does not contain complementing sets of the same cardinality.
There are nondictatorial Γ-anonymous reasonable B-ecological welfare functions
on I.
4. Discussion.
4.1. Open problems. We have seen that Armstrong’s notion of “ob-
servable” coalitions which form an algebra B (such that [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I)) can
be extended to a deﬁnition of “describable” decision rules which are elements
of a Weglorz model WΓ
B . The additional ingredient is a group Γ (such that
Sﬁnite(I) < Γ < Aut(B)) which may be interpreted as a notion of “equal treat-
ment”.
The existence of a dictator for “describable” and reasonable social (or
ecological) welfare functions (Arrow’s theorem) depends on both B and Γ: If B =
P(I) and Γ = S(I), then there is a dictator who disappears, if B or Γ become
“small”. Thus Arrow’s axioms (which are logically inconsistent for ﬁnitely many
individuals) remain empirically inconsistent (not realizable in an empirically
meaningful way) for inﬁnite societies, if they are combined with stronger notions
of “equal treatment” (within given coalitions: “ﬁnite discrimination”) embodied
in Γ and liberal regulations B about coalition forming. It is an open problem in
set theory to characterize these combinations (“dictator problem”):
Problem 1. Find a simple criterion about B and Γ which tells if in WΓ
B
there is a free ultraﬁlter on A.
A possible extension of our results depends on a weakening of the de-
terministic decision rules of this paper to randomized ones, where for example
a lottery chooses a dictator. In Armstrong’s context we may deﬁne the lottery
from a ﬁnitely additive probability measure µ on B, where µ(B) is the prob-
ability that the coalition B ∈ B contains the dictator. As follows from lemma
13, if I = ω, B = P(ω) and Γ = S(I), then the lotteries which may be repre-
sented as sets of the corresponding Weglorz model (short: symmetric lotteries)
involve only ﬁnitely many individuals. In this model symmetric lotteries have
“oligarchic” characteristics: They ignore the preferences of most individuals. On
the other hand, by the following lemma 38 (an observation on p. 112 of [7]), the
following reasoning about decision rules of A in WΓ
B is false: “If all deterministic
symmetric reasonable social welfare functions are dictatorial, then all symmetric
randomized decision rules have oligarchic characteristics.”
Lemma 38. Set I = Z, let B be the algebra which is generated by the
22arithmetic sequences and the ﬁnite sets and let the group Γ be generated by the
translations and the ﬁnite permutations. Then
(i) WΓ
B |=“Each ultraﬁlter on A is principal” and
(ii) WΓ
B |= “There is a probability measure µ on P(A) which vanishes on the
ﬁnite sets”.
The society of the lemma is best understood as the set of all (past
and future) generations of one individual. (They are represented by the atoms
of the model.) The lottery samples the “present generation” which decides.
The algebra B resembles the coalitions which are computed by ﬁnite automata
(c.f. [8]). The group Γ says that the decision rule is not biased towards a
particular choice of “present” (invariance of µ w.r. to the translation x 7→ x+1)




2n−1 is an example of a measure for lemma 38.
We conclude with a randomized version of the “dictator problem”.
Problem 2. Find a simple criterion about B and Γ which tells if in WΓ
B
there is a probability measure µ on A which vanishes on the ﬁnite sets.
Lemmas 28 and 37 seem to resolve Arrow’s theorem, if B or Γ are
“small”. We object to this resolution: B and Γ deﬁne a notion of “empirical
meaningfulness” which should be applicable in ﬁelds diﬀerent from economy, too.
Results of [6] about Gleason’s theorem in the Hilbert space `2(A) of the model
WΓ
B suggest refuting “small” algebras B or Γ. The quantum theory notation for
the following lemma (which slightly extends [6]) is explained in [15] and [17].
Lemma 39. Let I be inﬁnite and assume [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I) and
Sﬁnite(I) < Γ < Aut(B). The following assertions are equivalent:
(i) WΓ
B |=“each bounded complex-valued ﬁnitely additive measure m on P(A)
is concentrated on a ﬁnite set”;
(ii) WΓ
B |=“the expectation values of (ﬁnitely additive) observables A on `2(A)
at (ﬁnitely additive) states σ exist”.
We conclude that quantum theory gives another motivation10 for the
“randomized dictator problem”.
Our main results express “describability” in terms of anonymity. We
have considered two extreme classes of decision rules; social (the “classical”
case) and ecological welfare functions. The “describable” reasonable social or
ecological welfare functions are topologically Γ-anonymous. For general decision
rules and general permutation models (instead of WΓ
B ) the following question
(“transcription problem”) is open:
Problem 3. Find an economically meaningful equivalent of “hereditary
symmetry” for general decision rules and models.
10 Alternatively one might restrict the admissible observables to the countably additive ones. This
condition, however, cannot be tested empirically.
23The “transcriptions” by means of the lemmas 22 and 34 depend on a
simple characterization of the symmetric proﬁles which does not generalize.
The standard proﬁle is a special case of a componentwise deﬁned proﬁle
(replace ≤ by some relation vi on R or more generally on some subset of R
pi).
It, too, is applied in ecology (c.f. [9]). By lemma 40 a componentwise deﬁned
proﬁle on the B-simple functions needs not be a set in the sense of WΓ
B , even if
it is B-measurable (c.f. lemma 20).
Lemma 40. Let I be countably inﬁnite and assume [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I)
and Sﬁnite(I) < Γ < Aut(B). Then in V (I), there are componentwise deﬁned
B-measurable proﬁles p ∈ V (I)\WΓ
B on A of complete and transitive preferences.
Proof. In order to construct p 6∈ WΓ
B , we let hPk;k ∈ ωi be an inﬁnite
partition of A into two-element sets (which by the premise are coalitions of B).
In V (I) we deﬁne vk as
r vk s ⇔ (r ≥ s or r,s < k)
As R is a pure set, this sequence of relations is in WΓ
B . In V (I) we deﬁne p on
`B(A) as
x ¹a y ⇔ y(a) vk x(a), whenever a ∈ Pk
p 6∈ WΓ
B : Consider the constant functions ¯ r ∈ `B(A), where ¯ r(a) = r,
all a ∈ A. If p ∈ WΓ
B , so is the injective sequence n 7→ Sn, where Sn =
P(n − 1, ¯ n) = ∪{Pk;k > n} = A \ ∪{Pk;k ≤ n} ∈ B; contradiction to lemma 4
(whose proof uses only ﬁnite permutations and does not depend on AC).
p is B-measurable (as deﬁned in sect. 3.1): If x, y ∈ `B(A), then there
is a ﬁnite partition hQm;m ≤ Mi of A into elements of B such that x(a) = xm,
if a ∈ Qm. If xm < ym, then Pp(x,y) ∩ Qm = Qm ∩ (∪{Pk;k > ym} =
Qm \ ∪{Pk;k ≤ ym} ∈ B. If xm ≥ ym, then Pp(x,y) ∩ Qm = Qm ∈ B.
Therefore also Pp(x,y) ∈ B.
The proofs of lemmas 22 and 34 answer the question, when a set F ⊆
WΓ
B of topologically Γ-anonymous reasonable B-social or B-ecological welfare
functions is empirically meaningful (lemma 41).
Lemma 41. Let I be inﬁnite, assume [I]1 ⊂ B ⊆ P(I) and Sﬁnite(I) <
Γ < Aut(B), endow Γ with the Weglorz topology and consider sets Fs of topolog-
ically Γ-anonymous decision rules F ∈ V (I) on X A
B (X a ﬁnite set of alterna-
tives) and Fe of topologically Γ-anonymous monotonic decision rules F ∈ V (I)
on X ﬁn
B (A) which respect isomorphisms. Fs ∈ WΓ
B (resp. Fe ∈ WΓ
B ) if and only
if there is an open Γ0 < Γ such that F ∈ Fs (resp. F ∈ Fe) and π ∈ Γ0 imply
G ∈ Fs (resp. G ∈ Fe), where G is deﬁned by (i) resp. (ii):
(i) G(Y,q) = (Y,¹G,q), if F(Y,qπ) = (Y,¹G,qπ), in the case Fs;
(ii) f ¹G,can g ⇔ f ◦ π ¹F,can g ◦ π in the case Fe.
Proof. Lemma 22 proves (π−1F)(Y,qπ) = (Y,¹F,qπ). Lemma 34
proves (f ◦ π−1,g ◦ π−1) ∈ π(¹F,can), if and only if f ¹F,can g. From this we
derive (i) resp. (ii) for G = π(F).
In the ecological context sets F of decision rules arise from an analysis
([9]) of the decisions of government agencies: The consultant who prepares a
24decision usually applies a “formalism” F which is adapted to the particular
problem through an “interpretation”. (It determines a particular decision rule
F ∈ F.) We conjecture that only “formalisms” F ∈ WΓ
B are applied. However,
the practically applied decision rules in general do not respect isomorphisms,
whence lemma 41 does not apply.
For example (we report an empirical fact but do not judge its sound-
ness), many methods of “life cycle assessment” deﬁne “air pollution” by means
of a weighted sum of the concentrations x(i) of the airborne toxics (i.e. F = com-
parison by weighted sums). The weights depend on the “interpretation”. ([12]
deﬁnes the weights as the reciprocals of the minimal illegal emission levels11.)
This example also shows that applied formalisms consist of sets F of decision
rules F with domain R
J , where J ⊆ I is ﬁnite (but not ﬁxed).
It is an open problem to extend lemma 41 to general classes of decision
rules.
Problem 4. Find an economically meaningful equivalent of F ∈ WΓ
B ,
where F is a set of decision rules.
There are obvious extensions of problems 3 and 4 to other classes of
decision rules.
For example, the “randomized transcription problem” asks for a charac-
terization of the hereditarily symmetric generalized decision rules F : (X,p,µ) 7→
(X,¹,p,µ), where µ is a (herditarily symmetric) ﬁnitely additive measure on
B.
An easier problem is motivated by competitive equilibria. An exchange
economy is a triple X = (X,p,e), where X is a set of “commodity bundles”
(e.g. X = (R
+)k), p a proﬁle and e ∈ XI an initial endowment. A generalized
decision rule F : (X,p,e) 7→ (X,¹,p,e) deﬁnes a social preference ¹ which
generalizes what is ordinarily called a price system and we may ask, when
F ∈ WΓ
B . [Commodity bundles are compared in terms of the values that
the price system assigns: B(i) = {x ∈ X;x ¹ e(i)} is the budget set and
D(i) = {x ∈ B(i);(∀y Âi x)(y 6∈ B(i))} is the demand set of i.]
Concerning problem 4, if a set F of generalized decision rules is given
(e.g. diﬀerent price systems), one may ask, if some F ∈ F admits a Walrasian
equilibrium allocation. [f ∈ XI is a generalized Walrasian equilibrium alloca-
tion, if f(i) ∈ D(i) for all i ∈ I. We skip the condition that f be a feasible
allocation. In an abstract setting (without sums or integrals) it may be replaced
by some notion of “aggregation consistency” which relates to the endowments of
coalitions.] Again, only “empirically meaningful” F ∈ WΓ
B are of interest.
In view of lemmas 23 and 24 one might wonder, if there are interesting
ﬁnitely Γ-discrimatory decision rules with more than two equally treated com-
ponents. As the following construction shows, diﬀerent supports Π give rise to
diﬀerent topologically Γ-anonymous decision rules.
11 The regulation 95/365/EC of 25 July 1995 by the European Community has transformed this
interpretation into a peculiar legislation; c.f. its appendix 4.1 on “toxicity”.
25Consider, for instance, a partition Π = hP1,...,Pmi of the individuals
into social classes Pk ∈ B, a preference v on X (where |X| ≥ 2) and an
atomic probability measure µ on {1,...m}. Deﬁne F(Y,q) = (Y,v |Y,q),
unless µ({k;(∀a ∈ Pk)(q(a) =¹)}) > 1
2 for some preference ¹, in which case
F(Y,q) = (Y,¹,q).
Since the stabilizers of supports deﬁne only a special class of open sub-
groups, we may wonder, if the example generalizes: Are there are any restrictions
on the symmetry structure of decision rules?
Problem 5. Given a class F ⊆ WΓ
B of decision rules, determine the set
{stab(F);F ∈ F} of its stabilizers.
4.2. Acknowledgement. The ﬁrst author wants to thank Ingeborg
Fiala and Professor Karl Svozil for useful hints. The second author appreciates
enlightening discussions with Professor Masahiro Kumabe.
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